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Since the earliest-known writings on the nature of human societies. there has been recognition
that social stratification is a central part of all human organization (Lenski 1966). In his Politics,
in 350 BCE, Aristotle wrote of the natural ranking of free people and slaves. More recently,
during the Age of Enlightenment, philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu
wrote of the feudal system of social stratification and its inequities (Zeitlin 1968; Strasser 1976).
By the mid-1800s, the classic sociological theorists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber began
more systematic analyses of system of social stratification using concepts that remain with us to
this day.
From the root word strata, we can recognize that social stratification refers to a ranking
of people or groups of people within a society. But the term was defined by the earliest
sociologists as something more than the almost universal inequalities that exist in all but the least
complex of societies. Social stratification refers to a system with rather predictable rules behind
the ranking of individuals and groups, which theories of social stratification are meant to uncover
and understand. The existence of a system of social stratification also implies some form of
legitimation of the ranking of people and the unequal distribution of valued goods, services, and
prestige. Without belief systems justifying the inequality and unequal ranking, it is unlikely that
a stratification system would remain stable over time. Beyond agreement on a definition of social
stratification. however, the classic sociological theorists agreed on little else. From this classic
period of sociology, we have, in fact, a triple legacy of social stratification theories from the
works of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber.

More than anyone, it was Karl Marx who attempted a more or less comprehensive theory
of social stratification. Along with Engels. in 1848, Marx began one of the world's most famous
political writings on the subject. The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1(64), by writing,
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Free
man and slave, patrician and plebeian. lord and serf, guild-master and
journeyman, in a word. oppressor and oppressed. stood in constant opposition
to one another. carried on an uninterrupted. now hidden. now open fight. a

fight that each time ended. either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at
large. or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (P. 5)
But when Marx was finally about to undertake a more detailed and systematic discussion of class
at the end of the third volume of Capital, he died (see Dahrendorf 1959:8). Although Marx
referred to several different classes or class segments throughout history, he clearly saw the
ownership of property as the basis of class divisions. In preindustrial agricultural societies, the
primary division was between the landowners. or landed aristocracy, and those who owned no
land, peasants and serfs. In capitalist industrial societies, the primary division was between the
owners of industrial capital and the working class, or proletariat. It was this exclusively
economic definition of class-that is, owners versus nonowners-that allowed Marx to conclude
that the elimination of private property in any future communist nation would eliminate
extensive inequality and even social stratification itself.
In strict contrast to a Marxian theory of social stratification are functional theories of social
stratification. In tracing the development of functional theory, most historians of social thought
draw a direct line from Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, through Durkheim, to modern
functional theorists such as Talcott Parsons (see Gouldner 1970; Giddens 1973; Strasser 1(76).
More than anyone else though, it was Durkheim who established this general perspective, though
interestingly he had little to say about social stratification specifically. This is somewhat
understandable when considering that Durkheim's holistic perspective focused on how parts and
processes within societies work for the good of the whole. Divisions between people within
societies were given little recognition.
Durkheim, however, did make brief mention of inequalities within societies. He saw two
types, what he called external inequality and internal inequality. As he described them in The
Division of Labor external inequalities are those imposed on the individual by the social
circumstances of birth, in other words, ascribed status. It was in mechanical solidarity, or
preindustrial societies, that these external inequalities predominated. In industrial society, on the
other hand, there was a need for internal inequality: "All external inequalities compromise
organic solidarity" (Durkheim 1964:371 )-that is, threaten social order and the proper functioning
of the division of labor in industrial societies. Internal inequalities were seen as inequalities
based on individual talent, or achieved status. For the proper functioning of the industrial system,

Durkheim implied that the people with the proper talents must be allowed to move into positions
for which their talents are best suited.
What Durkheim anticipated was a meritocracy based on equality of opportunity.
Inequality would be there, but he believed an inequality based on merit was needed. And
although Durkheim's ideas paralleled somewhat those of many modern functionalists, given his
overriding concern with solidarity and moral integration in society, his stress was different. The
dominance of internal over external inequality, he believed, was most important for the
maintenance of social solidarity. If external inequalities were forced on individuals, "constraint
alone, more or less violent and more or less direct. binds them to their functions; in consequence,
only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is possible" (see Lukes 1973: 175). Thus, in contrast to
Davis and Moore (1945), Durkheim was more concerned with moral integration and cooperation
than he was with the efficient staffing of "important" positions in industrial society.
Soon after Marx's death, sociologist Max Weber took issue with Marx's one-dimensional
view of social stratification in writings often referred to as a debate with Marx's ghost. Weber
recognized that humans have always been divided by not only economic ownership but also
occupational skills, status, and organizational power or class, status, and power/party (see Gerth
and Mills 1946: 181-(4). In a sense, Weber recognized two forms of economic divisions under
the term class-divisions based on ownership as well as divisions based on occupational skills (or
one's relation to the marketplace). Weber then recognized that people could be divided over
honor, status, or prestige with respect to a strongly held value system (particularly one based on
religion) and political or organizational power. It was this power/party dimension that Weber
believed would be increasingly important in modern industrial societies, especially because of
the necessity of political and corporate bureaucracies and organizations (such as labor unions),
which challenge those in higher ranks in these bureaucracies.
Max Weber's multidimensional view of social stratification became the most accepted
perspective among twentieth-century sociologists. Among other things, Weber's more complex
view of social stratification allow sociologists to explain the rapidly growing middle class, as
more occupations emerged between the owners of capital and the unskilled working class.
Equally important, Weber's multidimensional view of social stratification could explain why
social stratification and inequality did not go away in twentieth-century societies that called
themselves communist. As Weber predicted, when one dimension of social stratification is

minimized, such as private ownership of property, another dimension would come to be more
important. In communist societies, this was the dimension of power and control over state
bureaucracies.
A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION IN AMERICAN VERSUS EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGY
Although today most American sociologists consider social stratification as one of the
most important areas of study, this has not always been the case. In fact, the importance of this
subject in understanding societies and human behavior has been widely recognized by American
sociologists only in the past 50 years. The contrast to European social thought is clear. Sociology
as a separate discipline of study in the United States dates back only to the early 1900s. But in
the works of the founders of American sociology (e.g., William Graham Sumner, Albion Small,
and Edward Ross), we find a rather classless view of American society (Gordon 1963; Page
1969; Pease, Form, and Huber 1970). The relative neglect of social stratification is not
surprising, however. Unlike in European societies, the old rigid class and estate inequalities were
less in evidence. The value system stressed equality of opportunity for all, and at least an
appearance of opportunity and democracy was in greater evidence. Not until the Great
Depression of the 1930s was this classless image seriously reexamined, and then only by a few
American social scientists. Even then, many years passed before the study of social stratification
was able to make a significant break with American classless mythology.
The first detailed American study in social stratification appeared in 1929 with Robert
and Helen Lynd's (1929) Middletown, followed later by Middletown in Transition( 1937). This
first work was to establish a long tradition of stratification studies of small community life in the
United States. But the general conflict perspective of this study was only much later a part of this
tradition. The Lynds' focus was on power and economic inequalities, and the overpowering
image of equality of opportunity in American society was exposed as a myth (see Gordon
1963:66). With the end of the Great Depression, their view of American society was placed on
the shelf and all but forgotten for three decades.
Of the social stratification research stimulated by the Great Depression, Lloyd Warner's
work (in the 1930s and 1940s) had the most significant impact, at least for the next 20 to 30
years. Like the Lynds' research, Warner's many volume Yankee City study was centered on social
stratification in small communities (Warner and Lunt 1941, 1942; Warner and Srole 1949).

Using various methods of study, from survey research to detailed participant observation, these
works sought to examine the extent of inequality and social mobility, as well as the meaning of
social stratification for the people involved. But the Warner School differed from the Lynd
tradition in three ways. Most important, the Warner School carne to define social stratification in
terms of status (Weber's second dimension of social stratification). As Warner and Lunt (1941)
wrote, "By class is meant two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and are
accordingly ranked by the members of the community, in superior and inferior positions"
(p. 82). With such a view, inequalities of economics and power were easily ignored, and the
dynamics of conflict related to these stratification dimensions were dismissed. Second, the
Warner School failed to examine the actual extent of equality of opportunity critically. In the
face of contrary experience highlighted by the Depression, this research tradition continued to
stress a reality of social mobility for all who had the talent and ambition to succeed, a finding
now disputed in a reanalysis of Yankee City (Thernstrom 1(64). We find in the Warner School,
therefore, an emphasis on social stratification as functional and necessary for complex societies
like our own. The conflict, the structured and hereditary nature of inequalities, the harsh
conditions for workers, and the extensive poverty all too often found in the expansion of
American capitalism were all but ignored.
Despite its neglect of class and class conflict, a tradition of stratification theory and
research was at least begun. The Warner School stimulated many students, and there was soon a
wide variety of research on subjects such as differing class values and lifestyles, occupational
prestige, and the degree and causes of social mobility (Pease et al. 1970). One review of the early
stratification literature found at least 333 research articles and books on the subject published
between 1945 and 1953 (Pfautz 1953). By 1954, the first American textbook on the subject was
published (Cuber and Kenkel 1954).
The break with functional theory came first with Floyd Hunter's (1953) study of
community power, then most dramatically with C. Wright Mills's (1956) description of a power
elite on the national level. Before Watergate, Vietnam, and America's discovery of poverty and
discrimination in the 1960s, these works were ahead of their time. There were soon new neoMarxist theories, more empirical research on elite power and conflict, and a greater recognition
of the long history of conflict theories of social stratification from the European traditions.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION THEORY TODAY
Toward the end of the twentieth century, many theorists began combining the insights of
Marx and Weber for more realistic explanations of social stratification. For example, rather than
accepting Marx's view of the state as simply an institution run by and for the capitalist class to
control others, the concept of state autonomy emerged as a means of understanding how political
elites are able to control or regulate modern economic systems to prevent the meltdown of
capitalism predicted by Marx (see, e.g., Skocpol 1979; Skocpol and Amenta 1(85).
Class Categories and the Meaning of Class
Other theorists began combining dimensions of stratification from Marx and Weber for
more sophisticated conceptions of class categories. The most impressive of these attempts has
been Erik O. Wright's empirical work (Wright 197Xa, 197Xb, 1997; Wright et al. 1982; Wright
and Martin 19X7). By following Marx's idea that class must be defined in relation to the
productive system in the society (i.e., by one's relation to the means of production), rather than
simply occupational status levels, as functionalists suggest, Wright has developed a four-class
model. With this four-class model, Wright is able to show the usefulness of both the Marxian and
the Weberian views of class.
Defining class in relation to the productive system, we have what Wright calls capitalists,
managers, workers, and the petty bourgeoisie. Capitalists own the means of production (factories
and banks), purchase the labor of others, and control the labor of others. Managers merely
control the labor of others for capitalists and sell their labor to capitalists (such as managers of
corporations). Workers, of course, have only their labor to sell to capitalists, while the petty
bourgeoisie own some small means of production but employ very few or no workers.
Most previous empirical research in social stratification has been done from the functional
perspective. Class positions, or, more accurately, occupational status positions, arc viewed by
functionalists as skill and status rankings on a continuum from lowest to highest. Pay, status, and
education levels are all assumed to roughly follow this continuum. In other words, functionalists
do not consider class divisions, but rather rankings, as on a ladder. However, these previous
functional studies have many problems. For one, research shows no simple relation between
these occupational grades and income. Another problem is that education level does not predict
income very well (see Jencks et al. 1972 on these problems).

Research by Wright (I 978b, 1997) has produced some interesting findings using these
new class categories. With national samples of people in the labor force, Wright's research found
class position (the four categories described earlier) to be about as good in explaining differences
in income between people as are occupational status and education level. It is also interesting
that capitalists have higher incomes, even controlling for or eliminating the effects on income
from education level, occupational skill age, and job tenure. In other words, being a capitalist,
and especially a big capitalist, irrespective of other factors such as education and occupational
skill, brings more income (see also Aldrich and Weiss 1981).
There are other interesting findings using Wright's class categories. For example,
education does not on the average help workers attain a higher income, but more education does
bring more income for the managerial class. And, examining people within class categories,
there is not much difference between males and females, blacks and whites on income. The
male-female and black-white overall income differences (males and whites have higher incomes)
are due primarily to class position. That is, females and blacks have lower average incomes
because they are proportionately more often than white males to be in the working class, as
defined by Wright.
Another recent conceptualization of class has been made by Pierre Bourdieu, a French
sociologist who came to be respected in the United States in the 1990s. From a French
structuralist tradition, Bourdieu (1993) focused on how meanings people have of the world are
shaped or limited by objective structures in the society. In social stratification, Bourdieu argued
that economic class positions shape the worldviews of members of distinct class positions. Thus,
these class subcultures result in class differences in tastes, lifestyles, and even preferences of
values (Bourdieu 1984, 1996). Through differing class subcultures, people of different classes
tend to draw lines around their class "in-group" and the "out-group" of people in other class
positions. Thus, people in higher-class positions come to define those of lower-class positions as
different and perhaps not as capable of fitting into higher positions in the class system. One can
say that from this perspective, "people compete about culture and they compete with it" (Jenkins
1992: 128). While there are questions about the extent to which these class subcultures are as
important in the American mass culture context, this perspective has contributed to our
understanding of how social mobility might be restricted or enhanced by how people in

higherclass positions (such as teachers with lower-class children) evaluate others in terms of
their knowledge of higher culture (DiMaggio 19X2; DiMaggio and Mohr 1985).
Despite the wide acceptance of these new conceptualizations of class, there are still
retractors who favor older, more functionalist views of continuous hierarchies rather than classes
at all. Years ago, Dennis Wrong (1959, 1964) outlined what he called realist versus nominalist
definitions of class. As Kingston's (2000) recent attempt at revival shows, the realist places
emphasis on clear class boundaries in people identifying themselves as members of a particular
class and interacting most with others in the same class; in other words, forming distinct social
groupings based on class divisions. There is evidence that Americans are less likely to think
about common economic class interests and are more likely to associate with others on the basis
of nonclass lifestyle or subcultural preferences rather than within their own economic class
(Kingston 2000). For the nominalist, however, most important are the common characteristics
that groups of people may have that influence their life chances and share of valued rewards in
the society, such as education level, occupational position, or bureaucratic power position.
People are then placed in class categories in terms of these common characteristics whether or
not they are aware of these characteristics and associate with others in the same class.
Related to this realist view of class are recent questions about the extent to which economic class
conflicts are important enough to influence voting behavior. There is evidence that voting in
national elections is now more likely based on moral or value issues rather than economic class
issues (LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris 1996; Evans 1999; Clark and Lipset 200 I). However, this
decline in class voting is occurring to a great extent in the United States only, and the United
States is most unique in lower-class nonvoting. In other words, something in the United States
has led to the neglect of issues important to the less affluent (Kerbo and Gonzalez 2003). The
majority of sociologists who continue to argue that class divisions remain powerful argue that
when the interests of the less affluent are being ignored in the political system, this in itself
suggests an element of class conflict.
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND STATUS ATTAINMENT
During the second half of the twentieth century, there has been more research in the area
of social mobility and status attainment in the United States than any other area in social
stratification (Kerbo 2006a, chap. 12). Social mobility refers to the extent of movement up and
down the stratification, while the subject of status attainment refers to the process and factors

leading individuals to movement up or down with respect to their parents' position. The most
detailed studies of social mobility in the United States following the functionalist occupational
categories were conducted by Blau and Duncan (1967), and then 11 years later by Featherman
and Hauser (1978). Since the 1973 data, there has been no research as comprehensive from a
functionalist perspective, though we have smaller studies providing updated information. Blau
and Duncan's (1967) mobility data were collected with the help of the U.S. Bureau of the Census
in 1962, with detailed information on the family backgrounds, educational experience, and
occupational history of over 20,000 males in the labor force. Blau and Duncan's study The
American Occupational Structure is considered the landmark study of social mobility in the
United States. The Featherman and Hauser study (1978) Opportunity and Change is designed as
a replication of this landmark study, with a similar sample of over 30,000 employed males in
1973. Hout (1988) updated this research with new data from 1972 to 1985.
The basic conclusions of this research are that intergenerational mobility has been rather
extensive in the United States, at least between the 1950s and 1980s. Furthermore, there has been
more upward mobility than downward mobility, primarily because of changes in the American
occupational structure. That is, with more jobs being created in the middle and upper-middle
occupational categories compared with lower occupational positions in this time period, there
has been more upward mobility due to occupational changes. However, most people move only
short distances in the occupational structure, and those toward the bottom have substantially
lower rates of upward mobility than those born toward the middle.
Unfortunately, large-scale social mobility studies of the Blau and Duncan or Featherman
and Hauser type have not been done since the 1970s. But smaller studies indicate that changes in
the American occupational structure due to corporate restructuring and changes in the global
economy have led to much less upward social mobility. Even during the 1972 to 1985 time
period, Hout ( 1988) found that the overall rate of social mobility was slowing for the first time
in the years we have data on the subject. He also found that while there was still more upward
than downward social mobility, upward social mobility had slowed. When we move from
indicators of intergenerational occupational mobility to the intergenerational changes in income
attainment, all indicators suggest less upward mobility and significant increases in downward
mobility. For example, data on income attainment between 1980 and 1995 in Europe and the
United States show that the income of the middle class, or incomes of 25 percent above and

below median income, has shrunk by 4 percent in the United States, the highest shrinkage of all
industrial nations (Pressman 200 I). In almost half of the European Union countries, in contrast,
there was in fact an increase in the percentage of the income of middle class. In another study of
income mobility employing a sample of over 6,000 American families, Hertz (2004) found
considerable drops in upward social mobility and increases in the inheritance of low income over
the generations. Other research has found the rate of income mobility to drop between 1979 and
1998. In this time period, almost 70 percent of sons remained in the same 20th percentile income
position as their fathers. At the top 20 percent income group, however, most sons had attained
more income than their fathers, indicating only significant upward mobility for those born
toward the top (Perrucci and Wysong 2003). And finally, other research shows that the position
of the United States has dropped below that of Canada and several European countries with
respect to income mobility in recent decades (Solon 1992).
As noted, one of the limitations of previous research on social mobility has been
exclusive focus on occupational status. In addition, this earlier research was primarily limited to
social mobility patterns for sons compared with their fathers. Wright, with research using class
categories developed from both Marx and Weber, has overcome these limitations. In particular,
the capitalist ownership category and the authority category have been completely missed in
previous studies of social mobility. Using a large data set from the United States, Canada,
Norway, and Sweden, Wright found that the capitalist property boundary is the least permeable,
while the authority boundary is the most permeable in all four countries (Western and Wright
1994; Wright 1997: 169-20 I). In other words, there is more intergenerational mobility into
higher positions of authority than mobility into the category of capitalist property ownership.
This is especially so for the United States (and to some extent Canada), which in many ways is
the most capitalist of all the industrial societies, has more inequality based on the ownership of
property, and has more power in the hands of capitalists and the corporate class than other
industrial nations (Wright 1997: 186-90).
In this research, they also investigated the expertise category, which we can generally call
a category of professionals and technical experts. The likelihood of moving into this expertise
category was mixed in the four countries, but generally between the capitalist property category
and authority category in permeability. Thus, given the importance of wealth in the United
States, and given that there are different chances of mobility into the capitalist (or owner) class

than into a higher occupational position (occupational skill level and expertise category) and
authority positions, it is here that we find the old studies of social mobility focused only on
occupational status. In an interesting addition to this research, Wright also examined crossfriendship patterns in these four countries with respect to these class categories (Wright and Cho
1992; Wright 1997:203-22). As expected, fewer people from outside the capitalist property
boundary had friendship ties to people in this capitalist class category compared with friendship
ties across the other class categories. In other words, it is harder to break into the capitalist class
and even more difficult to form friendship ties with people in this class if the person is not
already in it.
Another issue of comparative mobility rates can now be addressed that was impossible to
address before the Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) study and Wright's (1997) class categories
research on comparative rates of social mobility for women. If the family unit of women is
considered (thus the position of the husband entered into the measure), what is most significant
"is the evidence of how little women's experience of class mobility differs from that of men"
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992:275). On the other hand, when the occupations of women are
considered, there is more social mobility compared with men, but much of it is downward to
manual employment. Women tend to experience more limited prospects of moving into top
positions in the society, even when born into families at or close to the top of the occupational
structure.
Wright (1997) has found some differences in the social mobility patterns for women
across countries. For example, higher-authority positions are slightly less difficult for women to
attain in the United States compared with Europe (Wright 1997: 192). Recent research in the
United States on women engineers has also suggested that the "glass-ceiling" effect for American
women may be becoming less of a problem for younger women (Morgan 1998).
Finally, another issue of comparative mobility rates can he made clear with the studies of
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Wright (1997). The United States has the reputation of being
the land of opportunity among many people in the world. These studies, however, indicate that
the United States is only about average with respect to its rate of circulation mobility, or equality
of opportunity in general. In fact, none of the advanced capitalist societies are radically different
with respect to their overall rates of circulation mobility. But in some places in the stratification

system, especially toward the bottom, the chances of moving up are below average in the United
States.
RECENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND STRATIFICATION RESEARCH
In terms of the specific subjects researched in the second half of the twentieth century, a
content analysis of the five leading sociology journals in the United States showed that more
than half of the published research in the general area of social stratification focused on some
aspect of social mobility (Kerbo 198 L 2006a, chap. 12). In the last couple of decades of the
twentieth century to the present, there is a shift toward more research on race, ethnic. and gender
inequalities. But there remains a kind of ambivalent relationship between the field of social
stratification and these areas of research. Arc theory and research on race, ethnic, and gender
inequalities to be considered subareas of social stratification, or are they to be considered
subareas of sociology in their own right? The trend seems to be toward the latter as more and
more of the research and theory seem less connected to broader theories of social stratification.
There are, however, other recent trends in research and theory on social stratification in
recent decades.
Historical and Comparative Research
Within sociology more generally, there has been a clear trend toward more historical and
comparative research, especially in American sociology. As many have observed, since the early
days of American sociology there was less interest in research that compared different societies
on the same issue, or even research focused on historical trends within the United States. The
research methodologies and interests of the classic European sociologists seemed to fade quickly
as the young discipline was transported to the United States (Gouldner 1970). Perhaps
globalization has had its impact on American sociologists, but new research methods requiring
fewer cases and allowing for time series analysis no doubt helped bring about this new
research trend.
Despite the value of more historical and comparative research, most of this research has
been quantitative and less sensitive to the qualitative differences that exist across societies
thereby making indicators and measures of key variables misleading. For example, when
comparing rates of social mobility across a sample from modern industrial societies, the issue is
whether social mobility up and down a standard ranking of occupations is equally important in

all societies. It is known that there is a strong correlation between how people in different
countries rank occupations in terms of status (Treiman 1977). But there are certainly other
dimensions to status or economic ranking that differ cross-culturally. In Japan, being an
electrician or a manager for Toyota or Sony brings much more status and long-term rewards
than holding similar positions in small companies (Kerbo and McKinstry 1995). There has
recently been more qualitative historical-comparative research that can counter these problems in
the quantitative historical-comparative research, which will likely expand in coming years.
Modern World-Systems Theory and Research
Over the last couple of decades, it has become clear that one of the most important new
theories related to social stratification comes under the general title of the modern world-systems
theory. It is now evident that no clear understanding of social stratification in the United States
or any other country can be achieved without reference to the affects of the modern world
system. The growing income inequality in the United States, the growing class conflict in Europe
over changes in class relations and rewards, the Asian economic crisis beginning in 1997 (earlier
for Japan), to name just a few topics, must be considered in relation to changes in the modern
world system. We must also include major world events, such as colonialism, World War L
World War II. and the Cold War, along with all the events and conditions these world-shaping
events caused, as related to changes in the modern world system.
In brief, from the works of Wallerstein (1974, 1977, 1980, 1989, 1999), Frank (1969,
1975, 1978, 1998), Bornsehier (1995), Chase-Dunn (1989), and Chirot (1986), modern worldsystems theory considers nations to be ranked in ways similar to the international system of
social stratification. From about 1500 AD, when the new modern world system began, nations
have been in competition with each other for dominance over other nations, especially with
respect to economic domination. Core nations are the richer nations on top of the modern world
system, with semiperiphery and periphery nations in lower ranks in the system, much like middle
class, working class, and the poor in an internal stratification system. Throughout this period of
core nation competition and conflict, aspects of a country’s political economy, including its
system of social stratification, have had negative or positive affects on the country’s ability to
maintain or improve its ranking in the world of nations. Conversely, this modern world system

has had effects on domestic political economies and systems of social stratification in both rich
and poor countries.
THE GREAT U-TURN
Another new topic of comparative-historical research in social stratification show the
importance of the modern world system in understanding domestic trends in social stratification.
Earlier research had established that as nations become more economically developed, there was
a clear long-term trend toward reduces income inequality (Jackman 1975; Harrison and
Bluestone 1988). New research, however, has shown a clear trend towards increasing inequality
in the most advanced and richest nations in the world, especially in the United States (Alderson
and Nielsen 2002). Other research has recently shown that government policies can strongly
affect the level of income inequality and poverty in advanced industrial nations (most
extensively in the United States), and why have not more governments attempted to reduce
income inequality and poverty?
Modern world-systems theory suggests two related explanations (Kerbo 2006a, 2006b_.
First, the greater ability of corporations to move across the world more freely has brought many
workers in advanced industrial nations in more direct competition with low-wage labor in less
affluent countries. Where the working class has less political influence in rich nations, these
workers have their standards of living eroded. Second, in advanced industrial societies where
workers have less protection, corporations from these countries are in a stronger position to
compete successfully for greater profits in the global economy. While the incomes, benefits, and
job security of workers in countries with stronger traditions of working-class political action are
more protected in the short term, a history of core competition in the modern world system
suggests that the competitive positions of their corporations in the global economy may be
eroded, and thus their standards of living may be reduced in the future. But this outcome is far
from certain because, as German unions, many German executives argue, more job security and
employee influence within the company will give German and other European corporations a
long-term advantage in global competition (Thelen 1991; Turner 1991; Kerbo and Strasser
2000).
RESEARCH ON POVERTY

One of the biggest contrasts between sociological research in the 1960s and 1970s
compared witht eh present has been a lack of research on domestic poverty in recent years. The
reason is rather reason is rather obvious; the Great Society Programs of the I960s generated more
interest and funding for research on American poverty in these years. There is evidence of new
interest and research on American poverty, however, with
several recent books with 1960s-style titles and tables of quescontents
recently published (e.g., Danziger and Haveman
200 I; Iceland 2003; Rank 2(04). Ironically, with this new interest in American poverty, under
the American administration of the early 2000s, there has been less research support and even
less data, as shown in the 2004 Annual Census Bureau report, which combined the previously
separate census reports on income and poversty into one report that left out much of the
information about poverty that has been provided for many years (U.S. Bureau of the Census
2004).
The reemergence of interest in American poverty is likely related to the continued growth
of inequality in the United States as well as the fact that poverty was reduced only slightly and
temporarily with the longest economic boom in American history between 1991 and 2001. New
data
also show that the poor are poorer in the United States than in previous years as measured by
how many are below 50 percent of the poverty line, and the percentage of poor people in families
with a full-time worker has been increasing steadily in the last two decades (Kerbo 2006a, chap.
9).
The new interest in comparative research in social stratification has also been evident in research
on poverty in rich nations. Not surprisingly, comparative research has shown less government
action to reduce poverty in the United Sates than other rich nations, with U.S. government
programs reducing American poverty by about 28 percent of what it otherwise would be
compared with reductions of 50 to 80 percent in the original 15 European Union nations
(Smeeding 1997; Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 1999:377; Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtless
200 I).
There is something of a surprise in this area of research, however. Previous comparative
studies of poverty in rich nations had to use spotty data on absolute poverty rates compared with
relative poverty rates. Absolute poverty rates are measured using a poverty line that estimates the

actual costs of basic necessities. Relative poverty rates are set at 50 percent of median income in
each nation. With the United States having the highest rates of income
inequality, the finding of higher rates of relative poverty in the United States is hardly surprising.
Now, although, the new Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measures of income across nations has
provided a new tool. The measures for PPP are set at what U.S. dollars would buy and then
adjustments are made for real currency when comparing incomes across nations. The current
U.S. poverty line is set at about $11 per day using PPP. Thus, we now have figures for many
more countries on a poverty line also set for $11 per day in these other countries. The surprise is
that about 13 percent of the American population lives below $11 per day (about the figure
below the poverty line estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau), while the figures from Great
Britain
is 15.7 percent and Australia is 17.6 percent (Smeeding et al. 2001). Absolute poverty rates for
other rich countries range from 9 to 4 percent of the population.
There has also been increased interest in global inequality and poverty in recent years, no
doubt stimulated by figures showing that world inequality has been at unprecedented levels in
recent decades (Kerbo 2006a, chap. 17 2006b), and growing protest since the 1999 World Trade
Organization protests in Seattle. New PPP measures have provided new perspectives on world
poverty, especially with findings that about 1.3 billion people live on less than $1 per day and
almost half the world's population lives on less than $2 per day (World Bank 2000).
The belief among antiglobalization protestors has been partly supported by research from
the modern world systems perspective. One of the most important research questions has been
whether poor countries have more or less long term economic growth when they become
extensively tied to multinational corporations from rich nations. While there is certainly
variability among periphery nations, especially in Asia, several early studies indicated that many
periphery nations do have less long-term economic growth when overly dominated by outside
multinational corporations (Chase-Dunn 1975, 1989; Bornschier, ChaseDunn, and Rubinson 1978; Snyder and Kick 1979; Stokes and Jaffee 1982; Nolan 1983;
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1(85). Poor nations that receive extensive multinational corporate
investments, of course, tend to have some economic growth in the short term. But the
abillonger-term prospects for growth (over five years or more) are in many cases actually harmed

by the kinds of outside aid and investment these nations have received. This research has also
indicated that outside corporate investment
increases income inequality within poorer nations. As noted above, the historical pattern for rich
nations until nomic development proceeds (Jackman 1975; Hewitt 1977; Stack 1978a, 1978b;
Weede 1980). In the case of poor nations, however, the rich tend to get richer while the poor are
either poorer or no better otl (Chase-Dunn 1975; Rubinson 1976; Bornschier et al. 1978; Stack
1978b; Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1979).
After the first wave of research on the effects of corporate investments In poor countries,
however, more recent research has shown less consistent and even contradictory results. Some
research using larger and more recent data sets of poor nations has found that extensive
multinational corporate investment now tends to produce more positive economic growth in the
long term, while another using recalculations of older data also finds out side investment results
in more long-term economic growth (Firebaugh 1992, 1996; de Soy sa and Oneal 19(9). Other
research has shown that outside corporate investment in poor nations does not lead to less
economic development when the types of goods imported or exported to and from the poor
nations are considered, or if the outside corporate investment is accounted for by several rich
nations rather than just one or two (Bollen and Appold 1993; Kentor 200 I; Kentor and Boswell
20(3). When many multinational corporations have smaller amounts of investment within a poor
country, they are less able to dominate the economy and political system and, in fact must
compete among themselves giving workers in poor countries some advantage. Still other studies
have questioned the negative effects of multinational investments in poor nations, such as
increases in income inequality with evidence that the poor in many of these nations do have
improved lives because of multinational investment. (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Firebaugh and
Beck 1994). Some authors of original research showing that multinational corporate investment
harms poorer nations have conducted research using data from the 1990s to conclude that their
original research was correct but that the negative effects on poor countries tend to be less today
(e.g., Herkenrath and Bornschier 2003). The current conclusion is that the effects of location in
the modern world system are more complex than originally thought, and the global economy
itself is changing. The conflicting research results on the impact of outside corporate investment
on poorer countries is also due to rapid economic growth in Asian nations with extensive outside
investments compared with countries in Latin American and Africa (Kerbo 2006b).

GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION
One has to be cautious about overstating the impact of globalization on domestic systems
of social stratification around the world, but we must recognize that the impact is certainly
increasing for both rich and poor nations. Furthermore, new comparative analyses of political
economy , or social stratification more generally, show that a nation’s competitive position in the
modern world system is affected by the nature of its system of social stratification. EspingAnderson (1990) and Goodin et al. (1999) have specified two distinct models of capitalism and
shown their differing outcomes for people in differing class positions within a nation. To their
two models of capitalism, which are found mostly in Europe and North America, we can add a
third Asian model as indicated below (Kerbo and McKinstry 1995; Kerbo 2006b). There are
differing outcomes for people in different class positions in each of these three models of
capitalism as summarized in Table 22.1. As noted earlier, much future research on class systems
and the modern world system, such as the great U-turn. will be devoted to whether or not one of
these three models will become the dominant one as global competition proceeds throughout the
twenty-first century.
Less-developed nations in the modern world system today are divided between those
forced into the neoliberal model of capitalism by rich nations and the International Monetary
Fund (especially in Latin America and the Philippines). those with development states (primarily
in East and Southeast Asia), and those that can best be described as "predator states," that is.
states captured by particular subgroups in the society and used primarily for the enrichment of
that subgroup only (most often in Africa, but also in some other countries such as Burma) (see
Kerbo 2006b). The questions for these countries will be which form of capitalism will be able to
sustain economic development in the twenty-first century. and which form of capitalism will be
able to promote more equally spread economic development that reduces poverty. Current trends
point to the Asian development model as,being most sustainable and able to reduce world
poverty. though Japan's long stagnation since 1990 and the Asian economic crisis of 1997
suggest that the answers are far from certain.

Table 22.1

COIlIltr;e,\"
Clwrm'rer;SIh"s

O"t("(ll/Il:,I'

SOURCE:

Competing Form~ of Cupilulism
Corpomte-f)o/1/i,lat"d Ctlpirali/wl
(Nt'olibeml)

Coo!','rm;I'e CtlpiwlislJI
(C0I7IfJmtist)

S/t/f{' f)"I'elopmem Cap;Ulli.wl
(Asilm Del'elopmellf Mot/eO

Uniled SWtcs. Cunada. Uniled
Kingdom
Small ~laIC. lillie government
regulalion. weak unions.
low tabor J.:OSI~

Western European Union

Japan and developing I.·oulliries
in Ea~1 and Southc::.st Asia
Strong ...tale inlcrvention.
eXlcn ... ivc r\.'glllationJplanning_
weak ullion:'!

Cheap production costs. high
inequality. low benefits to
workers. Ic~" job security. low
unemployment. high poverty.
low taxes
Kcrblll~OO6b. chap.

J.

~()()6a.

coulllrje~

Large welfare state. stale
regulalion of the economy.
ccollomit, planning, ...Irang
unions
High production \:ost..:;. low
inequality. high worker bCllctits,
high job security. high
unemployment 1m\' povcrty.
high taxes

chap. 1-'). ,\1'0 "'ee bping-Andl·r.. . tm

(\9IK)).

Mediulll produl.:tion 1.:0~ts. low
inequalilY. mediulll worker
benefits, mediul11 job sel.:urity.
low un\.'rnplnymellt. low
poverty. low taxes

Goodin et a!. i 1')4.)4.)). ;md Kerbo and M..:Kin.. . lry (IW51.

